BERNARD SALANIE THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTS PDF

BERNARD SALANIE THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTS PDF

Jul 2, 2020 History by admin

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data. Salanie, Bernard. [Theorie des contrats. English]. The economics of contracts: primer / Bernard Salanie. By Bernard Salanié; Abstract: The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic. The Economics of Contracts: A Primer. Article · January with 99 Reads. Cite this publication. Bernard Salanie at Columbia University. Bernard Salanie.

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The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, 2nd Edition, vol 1

The following articles are merged in Scholar. Their combined citations are counted only for the first article. This “Cited by” count includes citations to the tthe articles in Scholar.

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Bernard Salanie – Google Scholar Citations

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Get my own profile Cited by View all All Since Citations h-index 39 27 iindex 69 Marc Henry Professor of Economics Verified email at psu.

Amit Gandhi University of Pennsylvania Verified email at upenn. Koen Jochmans University of Cambridge Verified email at cam.

Professor of Economics, Columbia University. Verified email at columbia.

EconPapers: The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, 2nd Edition, vol 1

Articles Cited by Co-authors. Title Cited by Year The economics of contracts: Journal of Political Economy 3, Journal of the Econometric Society, Journal of Applied Econometrics 17 1, Articles 1—20 Show xalanie.

The economics of contracts: Asymmetric information in insurance: Estimating preferences under risk: Long-term, short-term and renegotiation: Should more risk-averse agents exert more effort? Does fertility respond to financial incentives?

Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: Estimation of multi-market fix-price models: