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16 set. Com base nas obras A teoria da democracia revisitada – o debate contemporâneo (Giovanni Sartori), Poliarquia: Participação e Oposição. A Teoria da Democracia Revisitada – Giovani Sartori. 5 likes. Book. From a contemporary point of view, within political science, reference may be made to the work of Giovanni Sartori, A Teoria da Democracia Revisitada, trans.

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Naturally, strategies and resources are different for each legislator, depending on his ideological persuasion, party affiliation and membership either in the governing coalition or in the opposition. It is known that in opposition it is always easier for any party to be consistent with its own ideology and program. Table 2 below presents data concerning deputies’ behavior on the floor during the social security reform votes in the Lula Administration. On the one hand, the above-mentioned change in the rules regarding DVS, which significantly reduced opposition’s latitude.

Services on Demand Article. In our view, the changes observed in legislative behavior can be explained by the impact of the elections on the way actors were located within the solidarity and organized interests systems in the different decision-making arenas. As to the DVS 3, which aimed at the exclusion of the so-called “indemnity funds” from the calculation of the public service’s wage ceiling, it was defeated by 27 votes towith PFL and PSDB siding with the administration.

Once constituted the majority coalition, actors set about operating it. Such a tendency had been already observed during the first round of the election, with the alliance between PT and PL, and consolidated in the second round through a deal with the PTB, an old ally of Cardoso, and the attraction of PMDB and PP throughout The distribution of preferences and resources among relevant actors, which may vary depending on the setting, will differ according to how these actors are positioned in the several arenas that, “nested”, constitute the game.

Theory and evidence from the Brazilian case”. They are basically activists and party leaders of the governing coalition and of the opposition, the media, union leaders and other affected interest groups.

Throughout the voting of both reforms, PSDB, PFL and PT had to deal concomitantly with actors inside the executive, attentive publics, consistent supporters and electors. American Journal of Political Science47 4: The particularities of decision-making surrounding the deliberation and passage of constitutional amendments plague the presidential agenda with high transaction costs, given the necessity of gathering supermajorities in the legislative arena Anastasia, Melo and Santos After comparing the contexts in which the different Constitutional Amendment proposals PECs were submitted revisitads the behavior by Members of Congress during the two periods, we argue that a contextual change namely a switch in places between government and opposition affected the distribution of preferences and resources between the democcracia and impacted the government in the various arenas in which the game was being played, and that revisltada a result the reformist agenda has made more progress under the current Workers’ Party administration.

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Our first point is based on a key assertion by Arnold which states that proposals of public policies that impose concentrated costs and yield diffuse benefits and, additionally, are submitted to a decision-making process where representatives are obliged to assume publicly their positions, may be characterized as “politically unfeasible”.

O Caso do Brasil.

Hence any explanation of actors’ behavior, their patterns of interaction and outcomes of the game demands an analysis of their preferences and resources, as well as the strategies available to them in the several arenas, during the two periods here considered.

The proposal sent by the Chamber of Deputies was discussed for four months and ultimately passed in second round in December As a starting point we assume that: Also in a minority, Lula would have to face an obstacle that president Collor did not have to the same extent: To win the presidential election, the strategy followed by the party made clear the option for softening its own agenda.

The PC do B faced yet stronger difficulties to get its legislators to cooperate: On the other hand, defections in the governing coalition were also large: Finally, the table includes the second round, held on August 27, How to explain this difference if, in both cases, we have the same kind of “politically unfeasible” proposal facing legislators involved by the same arenas and institutional arrangements, with the exception of rules for the use of DVSs?

In the following discussion, we seek to use this argument to explain why legislators’ behavior towards social security reform changed from the Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration to the Lula one. If Cardoso faced a disciplined and cohesive opposition during the votes on PEC 33, with Lula the picture greatly changed with the exception of Prona Tellingly, all PFL senators from states ruled by the party voted against their leader.


A Teoria Da Democracia Revisitada – Giovanni Sartori – Google Books

In this view, the two above-mentioned characteristics would be able to “shield” the national decision-making process, preventing or inhibiting tendencies prone to power dispersal. To answer that question one needs firstly to take into account that the Lula Administration is not, and has never been an exclusively PT-led government. The scores were as follows: Differently, the PC do B did not take sides in the issue of retiree’s contribution, freeing its deputies to vote as they wished.

To begin with, the electorate votes for two legislative houses using distinct electoral rules. These variations were considered in our calculation. Of all the six factors shown, the last was certainly the democracja relevant.

Conjoined, these features form a landscape in which the president has enough resources to determine the agenda and the pace of proceedings within Congress, while leaders can get their caucuses to behave in a cooperative and disciplined fashion, a fact that would minimize, if not nullify, the veto power of the legislative over executive’s actions. Such a difference could lie in the support mustered by each president in Congress in their respective periods.

Hence the cohesive and disciplined party from opposition times simply split once in office. Legislative Studies Quarterlyrrevisitada 1: The party’s position in Teorka collided with ggiovanni governors’ interests, all of them supporting the proposal sent by Lula.

O que foi escrito sobre democracia

A proposal presented by either the Chamber of Deputies or the Federal Senate has to be signed by at least one third of its members; the other alternative is a joint presentation by a majority of the state assemblies, backed by a plurality of the votes cast in each of them. English pdf Article in xml format Article references How to cite this article Automatic translation Send this article by democraci.

The worst performance of the governing coalition, as expected, occurred in the decision on the retiree’s contribution. These changes led to the concentration of agenda powers in the hands of party leaders and the president, restricting significantly the discretion of other actors.